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 THE EARLY HISTORY OF SAVINGS BANKS 
 
Cormac Ó Gráda 
 
    When a poor man has saved up a little money, he generally puts it 
into the Funds as it is called, or deposits it in a savings bank, which 
does this for him; he is then one of the Government’s creditors...  and 
all Government creditors, that is, all who have money in the Funds, or 
in the savings banks, receive their share of it as a just debt. 
 
Irish National School Reading Book No. 41 
 
 
  1.  BEGINNINGS:           
It is often suggested that the poor and the working classes don’t save—or  at 
least that they don’t save much.2  Controversies about the trade-off between 
economic ‘justice’ and economic growth turn, in part at least, on this assumption.  
Social reformers, however, have long sought to make the poor save.  In Britain 
during the Industrial Revolution, when the safety nets of the parish and the extended 
family were being stretched by an increasingly mobile labour force and by 
technological change, there was no shortage of schemes for encouraging them to do 
so.  These schemes were particularly directed at ‘industrious and frugal’ servants and 
tradesmen, and more generally at those who might easily be reduced to destitution 
by unemployment, illness, or old age.  Saving for a rainy day might have been 
second nature to the sober businessman and the frugal farmer; not so the labourer or 
the servant.  One early proponent claimed that saving was not ‘an intuitive faculty of 
the mind’, and needed to be taught, like reading and writing.3  
In 1793 the British parliament passed a scheme to promote friendly societies.  
Soon, though, such societies were being criticised for being wasteful and too 
narrowly focused.  The idea of a banking institution created specifically to promote 
saving by the poor grew out of an emerging critique of friendly societies.  In 1797 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham proposed ‘frugality banks’ as part of a scheme for 
pauper management.4  Of several schemes to encourage working-class thrift the most 
important would prove to be the provident institution or trustee savings bank.  It usually dates its beginnings from the foundation of a savings bank in a cottage in 
Ruthwell near the town of Dumfries in lowland Scotland in 1810. 
The Ruthwell bank was the brainchild of the local rector, Rev. Henry Duncan.   
Duncan’s status in the history of savings banks rivals that of Sir Richard Arkwright 
or James Watt in the history of the industrial revolution.  Today the one room cottage 
that housed his bank is a museum.  As it happened, the rules governing Duncan’s 
bank were too complex and the village of Ruthwell too small for his model to offer 
the prototype of a thriving savings bank, but key features of Duncan’s plan  –  a low 
minimum deposit, ease of withdrawal, and an attractive return on savings  –  would 
endure.  Three years later a savings bank was founded in Edinburgh.  Its less 
cumbersome structure and rules would prove more influential than Duncan’s model.   
There were two important differences between the Ruthwell and Edinburgh 
models.  First, Ruthwell’s board of trustees was elected by the members, whereas 
Edinburgh’s board was a self-perpetuating group of middle-class philanthropists.  
Second, while the Ruthwell model required that trustees monitor the character of 
savers, Edinburgh ignored this constricting and time-consuming stipulation.5  The 
Ruthwell model capitalized on the face-to-face character of village society, but the 
viability of savings banks required towns and cities rather than villages.  Deposits in 
the Ruthwell bank peaked at only £3,326 in 1835.  Thereafter, with the creation of 
savings banks in the neighbouring towns of Dumfries and Annan, business at 
Ruthwell dwindled, and in 1875 the remaining twenty-nine accounts were 
transferred to Annan and Rev. Duncan’s pioneering creation wound up. 
From Scotland the new concept spread very rapidly throughout the United 
Kingdom.  It became fashionable for successful businessmen, professional people, 
clergymen, and the gentry to become involved in savings banks as trustees, patrons, 
or part-time managers.  Economists David Ricardo and Thomas Malthus were 
managers of a savings bank set up in London by middle-class activist Joseph Hume 
in 1816, and for a time Ricardo was one of the driving forces behind another 
established in Tetbury near his country seat at Gatcomb Park in 1817.6  Such people 
saw themselves as enlightened philanthropists.  As Ricardo confided to a friend, ‘the 
rich have no other personal object in view excepting the interest which every man 
must have in good government  –  and in the general prosperity’.7 
The desire to make the poor industrious was coupled with a self-interested concern to reduce the nuisances of poor relief and street begging.  Edinburgh’s first 
attempt at launching a savings bank emanated from the city’s Society for the 
Suppression of Beggars.  And it was no accident that the first location of Belfast’s 
savings bank was an annex to the local house of industry or, indeed, that the famous 
Irish Poor Inquiry of the mid-1830s included an investigation into Irish charitable 
savings and credit institutions.  Further afield the initial failure of the proponents of a 
‘bank for savings’ in New York City prompted them to establish a ‘society for the 
prevention of pauperism’ instead8  The system thus embodied a paternalism that 
seemed to unite the interest of rich and poor, but at the expense of the former having 
to reveal their saving habits to the latter.  The link between saving and pauperism 
made some of those targeted by the middle- and upper-class philanthropists 
suspicious.  Confusing intent and outcome, they saw the banks as a sinister ploy to 
keep down wages and abolish the poor laws.  The radical writer William Cobbett, an 
implacable enemy of the banks, repeatedly articulated such fears in England. 
So influential was the support for the new institutions that parliamentary 
backing was soon forthcoming.  Separate acts to encourage the spread of savings 
banks in Ireland and in England (57, George III, cap cv and 57, George III, cap cxxx) 
were passed by the London parliament in July 1817.  As a confidence building 
measure, the legislation stipulated that the banks’ deposits be placed on account with 
the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt.  This explains the claim 
that the industrious poor now had a stake in the country.9  The acts fixed the rate of 
interest payable on deposits placed by banks with the National Debt Commissioners 
at a generous 3d per cent per diem or 4.55 per cent per annum.  In an attempt at 
ensuring that the banks concentrate on smaller savers the legislation limited 
depositors to investments of £50 per annum in Ireland and £100 in Britain, and 
exempted bank transactions from stamp duties.  It also prohibited trustees from 
having a financial interest in a savings bank.   George Rose (1744-1818), an elderly 
Tory M.P., was the driving force behind the legislation.  Like other proponents, he 
believed that the spread of savings banks would ‘gradually do away [with] the evils 
of the system of poor laws’.  Such sentiments led to the fear in some quarters that 
savers would risk losing their entitlement to parish relief under the Old Poor Law, 
which explains why Rose’s act contained a clause guaranteeing savers against that 
eventuality.10  Against the objection that the legislation had not been demanded by those whom it sought to protect, Rose argued that ‘both the principle and the detail 
of such an institution was beyond the common ideas of persons engaged in daily and 
manual labour’11. 
Rose’s scheme thus relied on a combination of public and private subsidy.  
While the high interest rate guaranteed by his plan and the prestige lent by gentry 
involvement were crucial at the outset, philanthropic volunteering was also essential 
in monitoring the banks’ activities thereafter.  Not only did the banks’ unpaid 
managers select paid staff to deal with account-holders, but they were also 
responsible for protecting savers against embezzlement.  This entailed monthly or 
quarterly meetings and frequent inspection of cash books and ledgers.  The 
philanthropy that helped establish the banks would not prove enough for their day-
to-day management.  It would endure, however, as guarantor of the system; in mid-
century the trustees of savings banks included earls, bishops, M.P.s, baronets, and 
medical practitioners, and clergymen of all major denominations.12   
The new institutions aimed to offer their clients three things: a relatively 
attractive return on their savings, considerable liquidity, and security.  It bears 
emphasis that before the savings banks there really was no safe outlet for small 
savings.  This was in the era before joint-stock banking, when many local, under-
capitalised banks were failing.  In any case, commercial banks shunned the deposits 
of the less well off, and usually paid no interest on deposits.  The bond and stock 
markets were beyond the reach of all but the comfortably off, and were risky to boot.  
The previous dearth of outlets for savings helps explain the initial success of the 
savings banks, and also accounts for the profile of the typical account-holder. 
By the end of 1818 there were nearly five hundred savings banks in Great 
Britain.  The rate of growth tapered off thereafter, and throughout the United 
Kingdom most of the savings banks still in existence in mid-century had been 
established by the early 1820s.13  The savings bank concept also quickly caught on in 
the United States.  The Philadelphia Saving Fund Society began accepting deposits in 
December 1816 and the New York Bank for Savings one month later.  American 
banks had to be individually chartered under state law, but on the whole they were 
given greater discretion over both the range of assets they could hold and the rate of 
interest they could pay.  In 1818 the state of Maryland granted the Savings Bank of 
Baltimore a charter that gave it complete discretion over its portfolio.  In 1831-2 the Poughkeepsie Savings Bank and the Brooklyn Savings Bank were the first banks in 
the state of New York to be granted legal permission to lend on bond and property 
mortgages. Such lending would dominate later.  Being allowed to lend on real estate 
and to hold municipal and railway securities meant that New York savings banks 
could pay higher interest to account holders than British banks, though it also left 
them more vulnerable to panics.  Savings banks were the fastest-growing form of 
financial intermediary in the antebellum US.  By 1860 New York City’s nineteen 
savings banks held deposits of over $40 million, or $50 (about £10) per inhabitant.  
This dwarfed the average deposited per inhabitant in Ireland as a whole (£0.35) or in 
Dublin (£2) on the eve of the famine or in England and Wales around the same time 
(£1.7).   
In Ireland the most active years for creating savings banks were 1818 and 
1819.  Thereafter the spread of banks in Ireland was less spectacular than in Britain.  
As in Britain the banks relied on local grandees to lend prestige, and on clergymen, 
and professional and business men to provide the initiative and to act as trustees or 
managers.  In general the management was ecumenical in composition.   The main 
force behind the Cork Savings Bank, which opened for business in 1818, was the 
Catholic Bishop, John Murphy, while the chair at its first organising meeting was 
taken by his Protestant colleague.  In Thurles (county Tipperary) twelve years later 
the meeting that led to the creation of the Thurles Savings Bank was convened by the 
Protestant archdeacon and chaired by a Catholic landlord.14   
Ireland’s first savings bank was established in Stillorgan six miles south of 
Dublin in 1815, but it seems not to have lasted long.  That Ireland’s first successful 
bank, the Belfast Savings Bank, which opened for business in January 1816, would be 
located in Belfast, should not come as a surprise.  Industrialising Ulster is where the 
Scottish influence, cultural and economic, in Ireland was strongest.  Many of Ulster’s 
leading industrialists and bankers had strong links with Scotland, and the first 
steamship service across the Irish Sea linked Belfast and Greenock.  
Like other Irish banks, Belfast’s was modelled on the Edinburgh Savings Bank.  
At the outset it opened just one evening a week.  Its earliest depositors were mainly 
residents of Belfast, then a fast-growing town of about thirty thousand people, but 
some came from as far away as Lambeg and Ballyclare, both nine or ten miles away.  
The occupational profile of account-holders is difficult to judge from contemporary impressionistic accounts, but ‘industrious mechanics’ and female servants were 
prominent among them.  Servants, who tended to get paid by the month or the 
quarter rather than the week, were prime targets for the savings banks.  Within a few 
months a dozen or so several saving banks had been established in towns and 
villages around Belfast and also in county Derry, though most would prove short-
lived.  In Ireland Ulster took the lead, but banks were soon set up throughout the 
island.15 
 The Irish savings bank network had been essentially established by the mid-
1820s. By late 1829 there were seventy-three savings banks, several of which would 
fail in the following decade or two.  Of the seventy-four banks still open in late 1846 
forty-six had been created in 1816-25, a further twenty-one in 1826-35, and only seven 
from 1836 on.  On the eve of the famine there were 95,348 depositors in seventy-six 
banks holding balances totalling over £2.9 million.  The total deposited exceeded the 
£2.6 million held in private deposits in the Bank of Ireland, then by far the largest of 
Ireland’s joint-stock banks.16 
   Long-established banks best withstood the pressures of the late 1840s.  Of the 
forty-six founded before 1826 six had gone by 1848.  These included the banks in 
Tralee and Killarney, which collapsed in sensational fashion in April 1848.  Of the 
next twenty-one, eight had failed by 1848; of the last seven, five had folded three 
years later.  The earlier savings banks were also bigger.  Other banks had failed 
before 1845, some for the lack of business, some due to fraud or mismanagement.  
Banks folded in Carrick-on-Suir (in county Tipperary), and in New Ross and 
Enniscorthy (in county Wexford).17  Like Ruthwell in Scotland, Ireland’s first savings 
bank in the village of Stillorgan, six miles south of Dublin, did not last the pace, and 
the earliest efforts at establishing a bank in Coleraine did not prove successful 
either.18 
On the eve of the famine the population of Ireland was more than half that of 
England & Wales, and more than double that of Scotland.  Yet Ireland had only half 
as many savings banks as Scotland, and about one-sixth as many as England and 
Wales.  Part of the reason for this is that banks fared best in commercialized urban 
settings, whereas Ireland was overwhelmingly rural  In Ireland as in the rest of the 
UK account-holders were disproportionately urban, with four of the main cities 
(Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Belfast) holding two-fifths of all accounts.  In Dublin in 1846 two big savings banks held about 25,000 accounts in a city of about 0.25 million.  In 
Belfast there were 6,387 accounts for a population of about seventy thousand.  The 
Cork Savings Bank held 12,510 accounts for somewhat over one hundred thousand 
Corkonians, but its catchment area seems to have spread more into the rural 
hinterland than Dublin’s or Belfast’s.  Other banks also relied on rural custom, but 
rural Ireland was less monetised than rural England or Scotland, and a significant 
proportion of the labour force was paid its meagre wages wholly or partly in kind. 
Since, with very few exceptions, the details of individual depositors have not 
survived, the spatial patterns of account-holding in general are not known.  
However, the addresses of over two thousand account holders in the ill-fated St. 
Peter’s Parish Savings Bank on Cuffe Street offer a useful picture of the catchment 
area of that large bank in the 1840s.  The bank’s location put it within easy reach of 
potential savers on the city’s south and south east, but the bigger Dublin Savings 
Bank, with its headquarters about a mile away on Meath Street, was better placed for 
savers from the densely-populated Liberties.  Deposits in St. Peter’s Savings Bank at 
its peak were only half those in the Dublin Savings Bank. 
St. Peter’s was the most extensive civil parish in Dublin.  Its saving bank was 
located on Cuffe Street, a run-down street linking St. Stephen’s Green to the 
working-class Liberties.  But the parish also contained some of the city’s best 
neighbourhoods. The bank’s ethos was protestant, and several of St. Peter’s 
wealthiest parishioners acted as patrons to its savings bank when it was founded in 
1818.19  A representative sample of account-holders in 1848 suggests that a very high 
proportion of them came from either St. Peter’s parish itself or neighbouring 
parishes.  In Table 1.1 three categories of depositor are considered, those holding less 
than £5, those holding between £10 and £30, and those holding £50 or more.  It 
emerges that small savers were much more likely to live in or near St. Peter’s, while 
substantial depositors were more likely to live in the north city, in Dublin county or 
suburbs, or elsewhere in Ireland.   Neither this, nor the finding that bigger deposit-
holders were more likely to live outside Dublin, is surprising. 
 




2. TARGETTING THE POOR? 
 
For age and want save while you may 
No morning Sun lasts a whole day. 
 
Tralee Savings Bank pass-book, 1820s20 
 
 The early supporters of savings banks everywhere, both inside and outside 
the legislature, identified with the industrious poor.21  By and large, the early history 
of the banks did not conform to the pioneers’ hopes.  From the outset critics of state 
support for the banks denounced the uneconomically high rate of interest paid on 
deposits and the difficulty of preventing the wealthy from free riding on a system 
intended for the poor.  The criticisms soon reached the floor of the House of 
Commons.  One M.P., noting how his own bank excluded the better off, found it 
‘astonishing how many persons of a superior rank endeavour to avail themselves of 
it’.  Another also worried about people ‘for whom such banks were not originally 
intended’ benefitting, adding that the poor had ‘rather an aversion’ to high interest 
rates.  By 1822 David Ricardo’s initial enthusiasm for savings banks had cooled, and 
he was arguing for a scheme whereby accumulated savings might be cashed in only 
on the death of a child or in old age, and which would yield a lower rate of interest 
than the savings banks.  But the gap between the reality of short-lived accounts that 
were quite sensitive to the rate of interest and the ideal of savings locked in until old 
age was a wide one.   Joseph Hume M.P., as noted above, was also an early 
enthusiast for savings banks, but became a persistent and influential critic of their 
cost to the exchequer.  Thomas Attwood M.P. declared that the cost of the savings 
banks ‘exceeded all the money that had been lost by one pound notes since the world 
began, and all that had been lost by the failure of country banks during the last ten 
years’.  Attwood, who represented Birmingham and had a keen interest in monetary 
and banking issues, revealed to the Commons that the bulk of the money in 
Birmingham’s savings bank was in deposits of £20 and above, and complained that 
such deposits were diverted from ordinary commercial banks by the state subsidy to 
the savings banks.  No country bank, declared Attwood, would refuse these deposits.  Defenders of generous interest payments countered that the ‘improved morality of 
the lower orders’ would more than compensate for any abuse.22  But the criticisms 
would endure. 
In due course legislation took the criticisms on board by reducing the rate of 
interest and the maximum deposit per account.  In 1824 the maximum deposit in the 
first year was reduced to £50 and that in further years to £30.  In 1828 the ceiling on 
savings accounts was reduced to £150.  Moreover, the rate of interest paid by the 
National Debt Commissioners on savings bank deposits was cut from the original 
4.56 per cent to 3.8 per cent in 1828 and 3.25 per cent in 1844.  In the mid-1840s most 
banks were paying account holders between 2.75 and 3 per cent.  Given near zero 
inflation and the lack of alternative outlets for small savings, this was still an 
attractive rate of return.  Yet in 1850 expert witnesses before a select committee on 
middle and working class saving declared that savings banks were still little used by 
working men.23 
Anxious to place the banks in a favourable light, their historian Oliver Horne 
asserted that ‘a few cases of deposit by persons for whom the savings bank... was not 
intended, can easily be magnified out of all proportion’, and claimed that ‘from a 
quarter to a half, in the early days, were domestic servants, the remainder mainly 
artisans, small tradesmen, women, and children’.  Horne admitted that labourers 
were few, but ‘the number of richer people depositing was not substantial’, and ‘the 
statutory limits of deposit prevented any serious abuse’.24  Horne’s official history is 
indispensable, but it is marred by its apologetic stance even on issues of purely 
historical interest.  More iconoclastic scholars such as John Clapham, an economic 
historian, and Neil Smelser, a sociologist, revived the old criticism that, on the 
contrary, the movement bypassed the really poor, and that its main beneficiaries 
were better-off savers, attracted by the generous interest rate paid.25  Their argument 
is corroborated by economic historian Albert Fishlow, who found that the 
subsidisation of the banks in their early years ‘was not totally, or even significantly, 
directed to the classes for which it was intended’.  Fishlow also drew attention to the 
shift in the composition of account holders in the UK after the amending legislation 
of 1828.  The reduction in the maximum rate of interest payable to depositors from 
four per cent to three per cent cut the margin over the return on consols from +0.5 
per cent to -0.5 per cent.  This prompted the more interest-sensitive middle-class depositors to switch their funds elsewhere, with the result that after 1828 the annual 
growth in deposits in the United Kingdom was less than the return on the sums 
deposited.26 
In Scotland the savings banks came closest to fulfilling their founders’ 
mission.  The occupational profile of savers was significantly more proletarian than 
south of the border, though it remains true that even there factory workers tended to 
shun the banks.  The Savings Bank of Glasgow was more successful than most, due 
to the high quality of its management, but the profile of its savers was not atypical of 
Scotland.  In 1856 15 per cent of ‘active’ depositors were servants, 7 per cent 
unskilled labourers, 5 per cent female warehouse workers and seamstresses, 24 per 
cent ‘mechanics’ or artisans, 16 per cent minors, and 9 per cent clerks and 
warehousemen.  While only 3 per cent were factory workers, this breakdown 
suggests a more blue-collar clientele than that implied by Smelser and Fishlow.  An 
important reason for the difference is that Scotland’s more developed joint-stock 
banking system meant more competition for the savings of the better off than in 
either  Ireland or England.  In the following chapter we describe how one Irish 
savings bank diverted considerable savings from the local joint-stock banks.  In the 
same vein one of the managers of the Coleraine Savings Bank boasted in 1834 that 
savings had been ‘gradually withdrawn from the branch of the Provincial Bank.... 
and lodged with us’.27  In Scotland the commercial banks paid good interest on 
deposits accounts, but most Irish commercial banks paid very low rates, and the 
dominant Bank of Ireland paid none until forced into doing so by competition from 
the newly-created Munster Bank in 1865.  In assessing the role of savings bank in 
Scotland, the distinctive role was played by so-called penny banks, sometimes as 
feeders or ancillaries to the savings banks, must not be forgotten.  As their name 
implies, the penny banks targeted only the very small saver.  More likely to be 
located in working-class areas than savings banks, some of their supporters worked 
very hard indeed at inculcating the saving habit into the working classes and their 
children.  Presbyterian clergymen in particular played a major role in promoting 
savings as an alternative to all manner of debauchery, sometimes engaging in a 
degree of intervention or social control associated in Ireland with priestly control of 
sexual mores.  Though penny banks were not unknown in Ireland their impact was 
marginal by comparison.28 Hard evidence on the economic status of those holding accounts in Irish 
savings banks is scarce for the early years.  Significantly, the very first annual report 
of the Cork Savings Bank (founded in 1817) noted that many of its depositors were 
too prosperous to deserve its benefits, adding that ‘this species of deposits, if 
continued, would eventually close the Bank, as no gentleman could be got to give 
their time gratuitously as Managers to conduct the money dealings of their equals 
and in many cases their superiors in rank and property’.  Qualitative evidence in the 
1835-6 Poor Inquiry suggests that in Ireland farmers, shopkeepers, and tradesmen 
were much more likely to use the savings banks than labourers, though servants also 
feature prominently in the categories listed (see Appendix 1.1).  And so it seems to 
have remained: in 1849 the local gentry ceased funding the small bank in 
Carrickmacross (county Monaghan), because depositors were ‘principally of a class 
superior to those for whose benefit the institution was originally intended’.29 
Scattered aggregate data offer some firmer clues on savers’ socio-economic 
status.  The following discussion is based mainly on the data collated in Tables 1.2-
1.6.  First we compare the average sum deposited per account holder in Ireland and 
in Britain.  In 1837 the average deposited in Ireland was £28, compared to £31 in 
England and £29 in Wales.30  In mid-century the Irish average (£28) was marginally 
higher than the English (£26) or the Welsh (£27), and double the Scottish (£14) (Tables 
1.2 and 1.7).  Since income per head in Ireland was almost certainly less than half that 
of the rest of the United Kingdom in this period, this suggests that Irish depositors 
came from further up the income distribution.   
Second, the breakdowns by occupation in Table 1.2 are of particular interest.  
Had the savings banks been mainly about ‘encouraging and rewarding the industry 
and self-denial of the working classes’31, savers in categories 7 (labourers, servants, 
journeymen), 8 (domestic servants, nurses, etc.), and 9 (dressmakers, shopwomen, 
female artisans) should have dominated.  In England and Wales these three 
combined accounted for 41 per cent of deposits and 37 per cent of accounts.  In 
Scotland they accounted for 37 and 38 per cent.  In Ireland, however, they accounted 
for only 16.5 and 23 per cent, respectively.  Variations in the structure of the labour 
force could not account for the difference:  it is clear that the unskilled and the lowly 
skilled formed a much smaller proportion of savers in Ireland than in the rest of the 
United Kingdom.  Tradesmen (a category which includes farmers) and women without a reported occupation were proportionately more important in Ireland.  
Since Irish labourers and servants were much poorer than their English or Welsh 
peers, it is perhaps reassuring to find that those of them who saved, saved less.  
However, the high averages in Irish trust accounts and in the accounts of minors are 
suspicious, as are those of gentlemen and professionals.  The high average sums 
deposited would suggest that in both Ireland and England  money which would 
otherwise have been deposited in joint-stock or country banks was diverted into the 
savings banks.  For reasons noted earlier, Scotland was different: its savings banks 
were best at targeting those for whom they were intended, and the average deposits 
there were lowest in all occupational categories. 
 These data strongly imply that Irish savings banks did not target primarily 
those that their founders had in mind.  A third comparison is offered by the average 
sizes of deposits and withdrawals from savings banks.  If the clients of savings banks 
were mainly men and women of modest means who saved incrementally one might 
expect the average withdrawal to exceed the average deposit.  The situation in the 
UK in mid-century is described below in Table 1.3.  Nowhere were accounts very 
active; everywhere the number of deposits per account exceeded the number of 
withdrawals.  In both England and Wales and in Scotland the average withdrawal 
was much bigger than the average deposit, but this was not so in Ireland.  Note too 
that the average deposit was highest in Ireland by a comfortable margin. 
   Surviving data on sums paid in and drawn out of Irish savings banks in the 
1820s (Figure 1.1) highlight the sensitivity of accounts to economic conditions.  They 
show a  sharp drop in net deposits in 1826 and 1827, a reflection of the crisis 
conditions obtaining in those years.  The continuing outflows in 1828 and 1829 are 
probably due to the decline in the interest rate on deposits in 1828.  Fishlow32  
interprets the decline of the average deposit in the UK from £33 in 1830 to £25 in 1852 
as evidence of very small deposits by new savers.  In Ireland, however, the trend in 
the average deposit size was up for most of this period.  The aggregate sum 
deposited in Ireland grew much faster than in England between 1833 and 1845—at a 
rate of nearly six per cent per annum.    
The size-distributions of accounts in individual Irish savings banks also 
suggest that many of them did not cater primarily for the very poor.  The distinction 
between deposits and depositors is apposite here (Table 1.4).33  The 43,281 Irish account holders with deposits of £20 or less in 1845 accounted for over two-fifths of 
savers but for only one-ninth or so of all savings.  Nearly-two thirds of the savings 
were held in the 47,318 accounts worth between £20 and £100.  Note that on the eve 
of the famine Irish GDP per capita was £10-£12, while a farm labourer’s annual wage 
averaged £10 or less. The size distribution of savings in Ireland at the end of 1845 is 
described in Table 1.4.  
In the cities of Dublin and Belfast, it is true, the preponderance of small 
accounts suggests that people on modest incomes were better represented.  In the 
year ending 20 November 1846 a clear majority of accounts (62 per cent in Dublin, 55 
per cent in Belfast) contained £20 or less.  However, in Cork and Limerick the 
proportions holding £20 or less were much lower—39 and 36 per cent.  In the towns 
of Castlebar and Boyle, located in the impoverished west, the proportions were 33 
and 36 per cent.  In Thurles, the focus of detailed analysis in Ch. 2, only thirty per 
cent of the 892 accounts open in 1845/6 held £20 or less. 
A ‘classification of depositors’ issued by the Dublin Savings Bank in 1844 is 
also interesting in this respect.  The head office of the Dublin Savings Bank was 
located in Meath Street in the heart of the city’s Liberties district, but the bank also 
had offices on Abbey Street and next to the old linen hall on Lurgan Street, and thus 
also catered for the north side of the city.  It sub-divided its 14,211 depositors into 
twenty-seven classes.  The variation in average size of deposit across the selected 
classes was not great:  the average of £18.7 deposited by 2,331 female servants 
represented the lower end of the scale and the average of  £32.5 deposited by the 621 
‘artists, students, and teachers and those engaged in scientific pursuits’ the upper 
end.  In between, ninety hotel and lodging-house keepers held an average of £23.2 
each, seven hundred ‘law and mercantile clerks and scriveners’ an average of £32.2.  
Over two thousand ‘minors’ held an average of £28.  It is tempting to compare the 
‘classification’ with the distribution of occupations in the 1841 census, but in general 
clearcut, unambiguous comparisons are impossible.  Servants seem well represented, 
however.  There was an account for one in every twelve enumerated servants in the 
city, male and female.  For the rest, milliners and seamstresses, leather workers, and 
wood workers seem to have been under-represented.  A similar occupational 
breakdown of depositors in Wexford in the south-east of Ireland shows that there too 
the better-off were over-represented (Table 1.5).  The strong farming presence and the very weak representation of labourers are perhaps the most significant features in 
the profile of depositors on 20th November 1841, though note that servants (one-fifth 
of the total) seem well represented too.34   
The sense that the savings banks had been ‘captured’ by the middle classes is 
also evident in an indignant editorial in the Southern Reporter35 in the wake of a run 
on the Cork Savings Bank in April 1848.  Noting that a single family had served 
notice to withdraw upwards of £400 on the following Saturday, it fulminated:  
 
We do not know whether other establishments of the kind are similarly 
circumstanced: but we do know something of the management here, 
which has ‘let us into a secret’ about the causes of the apparent panic in 
our city.  Does (the £350,000 on deposit) belong to our poor? Are they 
parties whose vulgar fears have caused all the monetary alarm to which 
we have been subjected?  No such thing.  The depositors are not the 
humble classes.  We know the fact to be so.  Their whole deposits in the 
bank, though for them alone its benefits were intended, are not 
estimated to amount to more than £60,000!  The rest has been lodged in 
evasion of the law by people of a class which was never meant to have 
the privilege of depositing in it...  The present run on the Cork Savings 
Bank is not their (i.e. the poor) act, but that of persons who should 
never, had proper care been taken by its management, been allowed to 
deposit in it. 
 
  In Ireland it seems that most savers were men, though the female share was 
almost certainly boosted by middle-class households operating several accounts in 
order to get around rules limiting deposit size.  A list of claimants for compensation 
in the wake of the collapse of St. Peter’s Parish Savings Bank (see below) suggests 
that the majority of its depositors were women.  This must be partly a reflection of 
Dublin’s demography, where women accounted for 58.2 per cent of those in their 
twenties, 56.4 per cent of those in their thirties, and 55.3 per cent of those in their 
forties.36  Women were particularly numerous among the smaller account-holders.  
Over two-thirds of those depositors holding £20 or less were women, but women 
accounted for only fifty-six per cent of those holding £30 or more.  These same data also offer some indication of the confessional persuasion of depositors.  Comparing 
the distributions of men’s and women’s Christian names with the pattern in the city 
at large suggests an over-representation of more ‘Protestant’ names (see Appendix 
1.3) .  This is consistent with the bank’s close links with St Peter’s, though the 
possibility that Dublin Catholics were less prone to save must not be excluded. 
While the new institution of the trustee savings bank caught on quickly in 
Ireland, it was never likely to prove as popular as it would in England and Scotland.  
Just before the Great Famine England and Wales had sixty savings bank accounts per 
thousand people, and about £1.7 deposited per inhabitant; in Ireland these numbers 
were eleven bank accounts and 0.3 deposited (Table 1.6).  And if in Britain the banks 
had little impact on the groups most directly affected by the Industrial Revolution37, 
in Ireland their impact on the pre-famine underclass, the landless rural poor, was 
even less.  It is striking that while per capita income in Ireland on the eve of the 
famine was probably less than half that in England, the average sum on deposit in 
Irish savings banks exceeded the English average. 
Then a combination of famine and a series of highly-publicised bank frauds 
inflicted serious and lasting damage on the Irish system. 
 




3. SCALE AND COST: 
Microcredit institutions tend to be small because they rely on local 
informational and enforcement networks.  For commercial banks it is a different 
story:  the law of large numbers and the need for portfolio diversification dominates, 
dictating either big single-branch banks or better still, branch banking.  This is why in 
pre-famine Ireland joint stock banks were, by and large, confined to the bigger towns 
and cities.   
What about savings banks?  Many of them, at least at the outset, did not 
operate on fully commercial criteria, relying instead on unpaid part-time staff and on 
free or subsidised premises with alternative uses outside banking hours.  Even in the 
mid-nineteenth century a quarter of the staff were unpaid, and one office in four was 
rent-free.38  Some savings banks were located in town halls, and operated from premises that were also used by grand juries or petty sessions, or even as lending 
libraries or dispensaries.  In Ireland several doubled up as premises for the local loan 
fund.  Where modest premises could be rented for weekly or fortnightly use and 
where managers were part-timers and paid accordingly, small could also be 
beautiful.  However, since the number of transactions per account-holder was 
typically small, with even a part-time professional staff viability required a sizeable 
number of accounts.  This explains why savings banks were more likely to locate in 
bigger towns.  In Ireland, though, many were still located in very small towns on the 
eve of the famine.  In 1845 eighteen towns with populations of less than two 
thousand contained a savings bank.  These were: Castleknock, Ballytore, Celbridge, 
Oldcastle, Abbeyleix, Stradbally, Castlepollard, Tyrellspass, Baltinglass, Gracehill 
(Antrim), Castlewellan, Hillsborough, Kilkeel, Killough, Warrenpoint, 
Carrickmacross, Clogher, and Castletownsend [nine in Leinster, eight in Ulster, one 
in Munster].  Most of the banks in such places were small: the correlation between 
town size and aggregate deposits was very high (over +0.9).  The average sum 
deposited in banks in towns of less than two thousand inhabitants in 1846 was 
£10,772, compared to £14,660 in towns of 2,000-4,999 inhabitants, £28,105 in towns of 
5,000-9,999 inhabitants, £46,520 in towns of 10,000-19,999 inhabitants, and £265,160 in 
towns and cities of over 20,000.  This suggests that many of the savings banks were 
located in unpromising places.  These banks, typically small, seem to have been the 
creations of resident landlords for the most part.  The landlord connection is also 
reflected in the added function of several Irish savings banks offices still operating in 
1850 (those in Abbeyleix, Arklow, Balbriggan, Boyle, Fermoy, Monaghan, and Sligo) 
as rent offices.   In Scotland a savings bank office occasionally doubled up as a 
branch of one of the commercial banks, but never as a rent office.39  Since a bank’s 
catchment area was largely determined by walking distance, with the great majority 
of customers living with ten or twelve miles of their bank, small- town and village 
savings banks were at a distinct disadvantage.40 
The number of depositors was also strongly correlated with the size of the 
town in which a bank was located.  Thus the biggest savings banks were those in 
Dublin (16,640 depositors in three branches of the main savings bank on 20 
November 1846 and several thousand more in Cuffe Street), Cork (12,510), Belfast 
(6,387), Limerick (5,454), Waterford (4,048), and Newry (3,096).   The smallest were in Killough, Co. Down (25 accounts, population 1,148), Tyrellspass, Co. Westmeath (104 
accounts, population 623), Cootehill, Co. Cavan (107 accounts, population 2,425), and 
Castleknock, Co. Dublin (139 accounts, population 156).  Nonetheless, the correlation 
between the number of banks in a county and the number of saving banks in the 
same county on the eve of the famine was 0.524. 
Aggregate data for 1848 suggest that Irish banks were smaller and costlier to 
run than those in Britain.  The average annual cost per account was 1.8 times that in 
England and Wales and three times that in Scotland.  The cost per pound deposited 
was also higher in Ireland, though by a smaller margin (Table 1.7A).  In mitigation 
these data refer to a year of severe crisis for Irish savings banks (on which more 
below).  However, more detailed data on the cost structure of the savings banks are 
available for 1850, by which time the dust had settled in Ireland, and these do not 
absolve the Irish banks.  They report the size of each bank (defined either by total 
deposits or the number of account holders) in the United Kingdom in operation in 
1850-2 as well as its management costs.  The same sources list the number of both 
unpaid and paid staff and the total wage-bill, the rate of interest paid on deposits, 
running costs as a percentage of the bank’s capital, and the number of business days 
in a year.41  Simple cross-section regressions using data on 42 Scottish and 52 Irish 
savings banks in 1850 (Table 1.7B) yielded estimates of average cost which put Irish 
savings banks of all sizes, but especially the larger ones, at a considerable 
disadvantage.  In Table 1.7B ACA refers to total cost divided by the number of 
accounts, while ACB is total cost relative to capital.  Note too that unit cost declined 
with size in both Ireland and Scotland. 
  
  [TABLE 1.7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Another of the ironies of the Irish savings bank system is that though it was 
meant to alleviate poverty, the banks were most likely to be located in the more 
developed parts of the country.  On the eve of the famine the province of Connacht, 
poorest and least urbanised, and about to be devastated by the famine, accounted for 
17 per cent of the population but only 4 per cent of the savings held in savings banks. 
The correlation across Ireland’s thirty-two counties between the average deposit per 
capita and one common measure of living standards, poor law valuation per head, was +0.59.  The correlation between a second measure, male literacy in a county, and 




4. FAMINE AND PANIC: 
 
     [In 1847 and 1848] no less than £372,217 was 
withdrawn from the Bank, and must have helped greatly 
to alleviate some of the prevailing distress. 
Anon. (1917)42 
  
    It needs no effort of imagination to picture the ruin and 
dismay which the failure of one of these banks for a great 
amount must spread over the entire country. 
Anon. (1849)43 
 
In the late 1840s two unrelated shocks hit the Irish savings bank system.  The 
first was the Great Famine.  The famine’s proximate cause was phytophthera infestans, 
the fungus which first struck the potato crop in 1845.  The damage inflicted in 1845 
was limited, and the catastrophe that was the Great Irish Famine really began with 
the second failure of the potato crop in August 1846.  Excess mortality continued to 
be high until 1850; in some remote areas the crisis would persist for another year or 
two.  For long rather ‘talked down’ and marginalised in Irish historiography, the 
famine finally attracted due attention from historians and economists in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  Though research continues into many aspects of the famine, there is now 
no disputing its apocalyptic character.  It is seen as the greatest natural disaster to hit 
Europe in the nineteenth century.  No class or region in Ireland was immune from 
the crisis, though its incidence was highly unequal both spatially and socio-
economically.44   
The details of the famine need not concern us here, but in order to discuss its 
impact on savings banks, we need some sense of its impact across regions and 
occupations.  One useful way of capturing its unequal incidence across the socio-
economic spectrum is to compare the occupational data in the population census 
reports of 1841 and 1851.  The two censuses apply broadly similar occupational 
categories, so they offer a useful indication of how different occupations and 
occupational groups were affected.  Presumably those occupations which ‘survived’ 
best in 1851 were those least hurt by the famine.  Note, however, that since population is likely to have grown somewhat between 1841 and 1846 the true impact 
of the famine is not fully captured by the data.   
Some of the main features are summarised in Table 1.8.  The overall decline in 
the labour force in the island as a whole was 19.1 per cent between 1841 and 1851.  
There were 14.4 per cent fewer farmers, and 24.2 per cent fewer farm labourers.  The 
shift in the diet forced by the potato is reflected in the increase in the number of 
millers and bakers, one group of possible ‘winners’.  The figures suggest that most 
trading categories were affected, though the number of traders overall may have 
held its own.  The number of servants dropped by one fifth.  Not surprisingly, given 
their vulnerability to infectious disease, there were also fewer medical practitioners 
in 1851.  The fate of doctors offers a reminder that though famine mortality was quite 
class-specific, it was less so than in modern famines.  Not only medical personnel but 
workhouse officials and clergymen of all denominations succumbed, mainly from 
typhoid fever.  The impact on the legal profession is less expected.  The decline in 
spinning was part exogenous shock, part consequence of the famine.  The small 
number of coffin makers (eight in 1841, twenty-two in 1851) is a reminder that during 
the famine most coffins were not made by coffin makers.  The mass evictions of the 
period probably explain why there were more bailiffs in 1851, and the demands 
made on the poor law why there were more rate-collectors.  The increase in the 
paupers and beggars group is as expected, that in sailors and boatmen less so.  Note 
the significant increase in the ‘all other’ category, consisting mainly of non-
agricultural and more urban occupations.  Replicating the table for Connacht 
suggests broadly the same pattern, but magnified.  In Connacht number of farm 
labourers fell by one-third over the decade, and the huge drop in the number of 
spinners is also noteworthy.  The ‘all other’ category also increased, but only by eight 
per cent.  In sum, the two significant categories to suffer most were farm labourers 
and servants.  Farmers were hurt too, but numbers in trading occupations held their 
own.  The shifting occupational distribution thus suggests that it was the 
occupational groups least involved in the savings banks who were most affected by 
the famine.   
The link between the banks’ fortunes and the famine is not straightforward.  
In the early stages of the famine some press commentary suggested that the banks’ 
seeming prosperity belied claims of hardship and crisis.  Editorials in The Times and Morning Chronicle linked the savings banks and the developing disaster, highlighting 
reports from Ireland of increases in deposits as evidence of ‘successful swindling’ or 
welfare fraud on the part of the people.  In Killarney rumours that the local savings 
bank was about to close allegedly induced workhouse inmates to escape in hopes of 
reclaiming their deposits.xlv  Such depictions of Irish ‘character’ fed on the kind of 
anti-social behaviour that invariably accompanies catastrophes such as the Great 
Famine.  However, both aggregate data and individual case studies seem to suggest 
that the economic shock caused by the famine dealt a serious blow to Ireland’s 
savings banks.  Between 1845 and 1849 aggregate deposits fell from nearly £2.9 
million to £1.2 million, and the number of depositors from 95,348 to 44,919 (Table 
1.9).  On the eve of the famine Great Britain contained nearly eight times as many 
savings banks as Ireland; by 1851 it contained ten times as many.  Of the forty-four 
savings banks in the United Kingdom that ceased business between 1844 and 1852, 
twenty-four were Irish.xlvi  
The famine placed all Irish financial institutions under pressure, and the 
savings banks were not immune.  However, the trends in deposits and in the number 
of accounts in the late 1840s are more complex than the numbers above imply.  The 
aggregates continued to rise in the early stages of the famine, and when decline set in 
the spatial pattern is not what one would have expected from our knowledge of the 
spatial incidence of the famine.  Population loss between 1841 and 1851 is a good 
measure of the damage done by the famine.  By this reckoning the famine was most 
severe in Connacht, which lost 29 per cent of its people in the decade.  Munster with 
22 per cent came next, a good ahead of both Ulster (16 per cent) and Leinster (15 per 
cent).  The pattern for savings banks during the famine were quite different.  
Between November 1845 and November 1846 aggregate deposits fell slightly, but 
there were rises in all provinces except Leinster (where they fell by 18 per cent).  
Leinster’s problems were due mainly to the collapse of the province’s second biggest 
bank, described below.  In 1845/6 deposits rose most in Connacht.  In 1846-7 the 
decline in deposits was greatest in Ulster (19 per cent), while in 1847-8 it was greatest 
in Leinster (53 per cent) and least in Connacht (34 per cent). 
 
 




   The main reason for the crisis facing savings banks in these years is different.  
The  systemic run on the banks in the spring of 1848 was the product of the much-
publicized, sensational failures of three Irish savings banks in 1848.  The collapse of 
St. Peter’s Parish Savings Bank was notable for being ‘the first real sign of a chink in 
the armour designed by Parliament’.  In the 1820s the Cuffe Street savings bank had 
been embezzled by William Bruce Dunne, sexton of St. Peter’s Parish, ‘a very correct 
man’ who doubled up as both cashier and book-keeper.  Over a period of several 
years Dunn diverted deposits not noted in the bank’s books into his own pocket from 
both new and existing accounts, and also managed to withdraw substantial credit 
balances without attracting suspicion.  The regular hours did not suit the ‘better class 
of depositors’, but they came to Dunn with their money and pass books out of hours.  
The accountant charged with sorting out the bank’s affairs in 1831 found evidence of 
over three thousand pounds in 67 accounts never mentioned in the bank’s books but 
merely recorded in pass books initialled by Dunn himself.  Dunn would enter the 
amount handed over in depositors’ pass books, pocket the money, and never make 
any corresponding entry in the bank ledgers.  In this manner he helped himself to 
about £16,500 before being found out.xlvii   
Dunn was dismissed in 1831 and an official investigator, John Tidd Pratt, 
appointed to investigate the problem.  Pratt (1797-1870), consulting barrister to the 
National Debt Office from 1828 till his death, was an unrivalled expert on the laws 
governing savings banks and official arbitrator in disputes involving them.  But his 
interventions regarding troubled Irish savings banks were unhappy ones.  Against 
the trustees’ wishes, Pratt advised that the Cuffe Street bank be kept open.  Fear of 
contagion and consequent losses to the National Debt Office were probably factors.  
Pratt believed that under proper management the bank’s losses would be made good 
within two or three years.  In the event the trustees, some of ‘the very wealthiest men 
in Dublin’, never paid a penny out of their own pockets.  Instead they paid out of the 
bank’s funds, and also spent £1,500 enlarging the premises.  Most of them resigned in 
the following few years, leaving as replacements men ‘from whom it would be idle to 
expect a penny’xlviii.  The new board compensated claims for which they were not legally liable.   
Mismanagement continued to be a problem in Cuffe street.  A run on the bank 
in November 1845 marked the beginning of the end.  So serious was the run that on 
occasion it required a presence of mounted policemen to keep the thoroughfare clear.  
In the charged sectarian atmosphere of the time the bank’s problems seemed fair 
game for its anti-ascendancy opponents.  The Tory Mail hit back and attributed the 
problem to the ‘terrible fellows’ (i.e. supporters of Daniel O’Connell’s Repeal 
Association) in control of the Mansion House.  On 9 December the O’Connellite 
Freeman’s Journal published a letter from a worried saver with £70 in the bank 
seeking advice.  He had been to the bank to give notice of withdrawal but ‘the place 
was guarded by horse and food police and [he] could not get near the door’.  The 
Freeman’s tendered no advice to the depositor but urged the trustees to publish their 
accounts forthwith and to make it easier for savers to withdraw their money.  Such 
confidence-boosting action would reduce the pressure.  According to Porter the run 
had resulted in withdrawals totalling £61,156 4s 10d by 20 November.xlix 
   Towards the end of November 1845 the national debt commissioners 
recommended that the bank be closed, but the trustees refused, believing that they 
would be liable for ensuing losses.  Despite press efforts at restoring confidence50 
withdrawals continued, and the balance due to trustees on account of sums invested 
with the commissioners fell from £180,814 on 20 November 1845 to £46,283 a year 
later.  In May 1848  the national debt commissioners decided to refuse further 
requests from Cuffe Street.  When it finally closed its doors on 10 May 1848 its 
liabilities had reached nearly £65,000 against assets of £100 or so.  Sensing that the 
game was up and that compensation was unlikely some depositors of the Cuffe 
Street bank began to sell their pass books at a discount in the following week.51  The 
manager of Dublin’s other big savings bank on Meath Street, which was badly 
affected by the collapse, would later refer to the failure of St. Peter’s bank as ‘one of 
the most reckless and audacious acts of spoliation and robbery on the part of 
trustees, managers, and officials’.52 
Two Kerry savings banks also folded in sensational fashion in 1848.  In early 
April 1848 John Lynch, actuary of the Tralee bank, confessed to having falsified its 
ledgers and books ‘to such an extent which render a long intricate inquiry necessary 
before we can ascertain with any certainty the outstanding liabilities of the bank’.53  The local Catholic press was, at first at least, very sympathetic to Lynch and his 
family.  However, it emerged that he had built up liabilities of £36,768 against £1,650 
assets, an achievement for which he got fourteen years’ transportation.  Lynch had 
operated the business from his own house, ‘which afforded him considerable latitude 
for carrying on his frauds’.  Since depositors called at all hours with their deposits 
there were no managers present to check entries.  One of Lynch’s scams worked as 
follows.  Deposits of £30, £15, and £27 would be entered as £3, £5, and £7, and a sum 
of £15 added to the coffers.  The manager would see that the sum lodged matched 
the entries.  Then Lynch would add a zero to the £3 and change the £5 to £15 and the 
£7 to £27, so that depositors who came to claim their money would get it.  In this way 
suspicions were not aroused.  Lynch, on a salary of £60 as actuary, pocketed about 
£28,000 between 1832 and 1848, though in 1848 ‘he appeared to have had but £3,000 
realised’.54  The Killarney Savings Bank, which held over one thousand accounts, 
closed its doors on 18 April 1848.  In this case the actuary, one D.W. Murphy, fled, 
leaving liabilities of £36,000 against assets of £16,582. John Tidd Pratt was appointed to investigate the plight of the two Kerry 
banks.  In the course of visits in May and June he met claimants and assessed the 
situation.   According to the law governing savings banks at that time, anybody who 
had lodged money in more than one savings bank, who had lodged more than £30 in 
any one year, who had lodged more than £150 as a whole, or who had more than 
£200, principal and interest, deposited in the bank was not a legal depositor.lv  Tidd 
Pratt’s stance on claims for compensation was tough and he enforced these clauses 
strictly.  He resented attorneys charging claimants five to ten shillings for their 
services, and the attendant implication that those without legal representation would 
not get a fair hearing.  He made his point by dealing with such claimants first, and by 
insisting on hearing claims in private. Tidd Pratt found ‘the greatest abuse ha[d] 
existed on the part of the depositors, with respect to their mode of depositing, and 
the amounts they invested, as well as an utter disregard to the rates’.lvi  However, 
public opinion seemed to be with the depositors.  The Tralee Chronicle protested that 
‘Indeed if the interest derived by the Government of the country from alleged illegal 
deposits since the establishment of those two savings banks were calculated, we very 
much doubt if the amount would not meet a large portion of the defalcation in both’.  
The Cork Examiner also criticised Tidd Pratt’s stance as ‘decidedly unjust  – though it 
may be legal’.lvii  Appalled at the abuse and flouting of the rules and at the 
complaints against him, Tidd Pratt defended himself in a letter from Killarney to the 
Freeman’s Journal in which he revealed that the average deposit in Tralee had been 
£40 ‘and in this place will exceed £50’.  One depositor had made claims amounting to 
£1,000, and others had claimed £800, £650, £450, £320, and so on.  In no savings bank 
in the United Kingdom had he ever found ‘so great a number of what I consider 
large accounts.’  He added that his duty was ‘far from being a pleasant one’.lviii   
 
As numerous Tralee account-holders handed in their pass books to the clerk, it 
emerged that ‘some of the farming class, apparently poor, had sums to a surprising 
amount lodged—even over a thousand pounds each’.lix  Similarly in the wake of the 
collapse of the Killarney savings bank,  ‘tenants, who pleaded extreme poverty to 
their landlords, paupers from the workhouse, and men whose outward appearance 
would lead you to look on them as objects of charity, were soon at the office door’.lx  
In colorful evidence to the first select committee on savings banks a year later Tidd Pratt spoke of ‘cases where husbands brought books representing the money to be 
the property of their sisters, and upon calling the sisters it turned out to be their 
wives’, and of ‘persons producing books before me stating it was not their own 
property, but was the property of their nephews and nieces; and upon my informing 
them that their nephews and nieces must come themselves, when the children came 
it was quite clear that they had never seen the book’.  Another man ‘had a large sum 
of money in the bank, and it had been stated that if he was pressed [for rent] they 
must sell his bed under him, and several cases of that kind’.lxi  Tidd Pratt’s irritation 
at what he deemed ‘the utter disregard of truth, the falsehood and subornation of 
perjury displayed by the claimants’ was understandable.  Yet while he was quick to 
spot abuse, he was too ready to accept the assertions of some of his friendlier 
informants as fact.  His report to the Lords of the Treasury Tidd Pratt, no doubt 
accurately, described the claimants as belonging ‘to a class of persons for whom these 
institutions were never intended’.  But he lacked evidence for his assertions that 
many had invested in the savings banks in order to avoid paying rent, and that 
others were in receipt of indoor or outdoor poor relief.lxii   
Tidd Pratt’s report was presented on 18 May 1848.  Its accusations were 
widely circulated in the domestic and foreign press and widely repeated later.lxiii  
Henry Arthur Herbert, M.P. for Kerry, declared that he had seen them in the 
Augsburg Gazette.  In the Commons and before the select committee on savings banks 
of which he was a member Herbert vigorously rebutted Tidd Pratt’s claims.  Against 
the claim that three prisoners in jail for debt ‘had presented themselves in custody of 
their gaolers to claim as depositors’ Herbert produced a letter from the governor of 
the jail that ‘no such circumstance ever occurred’.  Tidd Pratt was forced to withdraw 
his accusation before the committee.lxiv  Nor could Herbert find any support either 
for the claim that workhouse inmates had claimed deposits back.  In the case of 
Killarney Herbert went to the workhouse himself.  He was given the names of four 
inmates who, according to the workhouse master, applied for dismissal at the time of 
Tidd Pratt’s hearings, and ‘whom some of the inmates of the workhouse had 
accused, in a joking way, of having money in the bank’.  Herbert engaged a friend to 
search the list of applicants appearing before Tidd Pratt for the four names, but none 
could be found.lxv 
The impact of the sensational failures in Dublin and Kerry was far-reaching.  Nenagh’s savings bank was also forced to close in 1848 when the actuary absconded, 
leaving a deficit of £800.lxvi  The decline of 14 per cent in the aggregate sum deposited 
in the Belfast Savings Bank in 1847 can be attributed to a combination of economic 
depression throughout the UK and famine in Ireland.  However, the city’s economy 
recovered in the following year, so the serious run in 1848 ‘by nervous and doubtful 
depositors’ must have been mainly due to the collapses in Dublin, Tralee, and 
Killarney.  In 1848 another £25,000 was withdrawn and by November 1849 the funds 
of the Belfast bank had dropped to £89,012 or by 38 per cent in three years.  Ten years 
of progress had been wiped out.  In 1850 deposits began to trickle back.lxvii  In Cork 
the trustees of the local bank were forced to withdraw £45,000 of their investment in 
the national debt during the first half of April 1848 in order to meet a serious run.lxviii  
The swindles in Kerry and in Dublin threatened the whole Irish savings bank 
sector. It led to two parliamentary inquiries into Irish savings banks in 1849 and 1850.  
The first, set up at the behest of Irish members of parliament and against the wishes 
of Chancellor of the Exchequer Charles Wood, simply ‘agreed to report to the 
House’.  It absolved the National Debt Office and the government from liability, but 
counselled indulgence by the government, and decried the removal of legal liabilities 
from the trustees by 1844 legislation.lxix The second report recommended the 
institution of criminal proceedings against the secretaries of the Cuffe Street bank 
and asked the chancellor to consider the plight of depositors.  However, it made no 
such recommendation in the cases of Tralee and Killarney.  Chancellor Wood was 
reluctant to compensate any claimants out of the public purse.  In the end he made a 
distinction between the two situations.  While the losses in Cuffe Street might have 
been avoided had the debt commissioners and the chancellor of the day acted sooner, 
in Kerry it was quite a different matter.lxx  Referring to the Kerry failures he argued 
in the Commons that before these demands on behalf of Tralee and Killarney 
depositors, ‘nobody [had] ever advanced the doctrine that the government was 
bound to make good the losses incurred by the conduct of persons whom they had 
not appointed and could not control...  The truth was that nearly all the fraud and all 
the loss had occurred through the actuary or secretary receiving money from 
depositors irregularly, sometimes at his own house and out of the ordinary hours, 
and contrary to the proper rules and regulations, and this, he was sorry to say, was 
with the knowledge, though would not state the approval of the trustees’.lxxi  Eventually the government allocated £30,000 towards the Cuffe Street depositors.  
Most  account holders got at least part of their money back.  An analysis of 
depositors’ claims revealed twenty of over £200, the biggest being sums of £590 
deposited by James Byrne of Bolton Street and £577 by Isabella Tennant of Francis 
Street.  Letitia Doherty of 45 Saint Stephen’s Green East had opened three accounts 
using fictitious names worth in total £285 7s 1d.  Savers with more than £200 
deposited obtained £100 back..lxxii   Wood then put through a bill proposing that Irish 
trustees in future be liable to a maximum of £100 each.lxxiii 
Table 1.9 summarises the shifts in the aggregate number of accounts and their 
size distribution over the famine years.  The total peaked in 1845.  A small decline 
(2.7 per cent) in 1846 was followed by much bigger drops of 14.4 and 39.7 per cent in 
1847 and 1848.  Unfortunately Table 1.9 cannot tell us whether small savers were 
more prone to closing their accounts than more substantial savers.  It is not possible 
from the published data to disentangle those who closed their accounts from those 
who reduced their deposits and fell into a lower category as a result.  Any 
assumption about the probabilities of closing relative to those of reducing deposits 
enough to fall into the next category must be arbitrary.  This would require data on 
individual accounts, normally unavailable. 
The panic of spring 1848 dealt the savings banks a very serious blow, from 
which they never fully recovered.  Depositors were slow to return.  The National 
Bank began to accept deposits of ten shillings or more at the current rate of interest.  
There was a run that spread from Cork to Dublin in 1853 stemming from a rumour 
that the Cork Savings Bank had closed for good, when in fact it was merely 
refurbishing its facilities.lxxiv  While there were no failures in Britain like those in 
Ireland, confidence in the system was undermined and the 1850s was a difficult 






Whether nineteenth-century savings banks succeeded in their original aim of 
making the poor more provident is doubtful.  We have seen how in the early decades 
at least the new institutions catered disproportionately for the better-off, who took advantage of the generous interest rates on offer.  Especially in Ireland, though 
undoubtedly some poor people took advantage of the new banks, the lion’s share of 
the benefits went to a minority of relatively affluent account-holders.  The fate of the 
elderly poor, in particular, would remain an abiding policy concern.  Almost exactly 
a century after Henry Duncan opened his savings bank in Ruthwell, Lloyd George’s 
Old Age Pensions Act of 1908 amounted to an implicit confession that the poor were 
still incapable of making adequate provision for old age through their own savings.  
The savings bank movement, fearful that it would crowd out savings, strongly 
opposed the non-contributory old age pension.  In the event aggregate deposits in 
neither trustee savings banks nor the post office savings bank were affected, though 
the pension may have been partly responsible for the big, once-off drop in the 
number of accounts open in the post office savings bank from 11.0 million at the end 
of 1908 to 7.9 million a year later.lxxv  This means that the post office may have been 
more successful in targetting the poor than the trustee savings banks. 
History is full of welfare schemes and regulatory legislation which ended up 
benefitting groups not originally targeted by them.  The earliest attempts at factory 
legislation during the British industrial revolution sought to protect children and 
women, but critics argued  the main beneficiaries were not them but the larger mill-
owners.  Such mill-owners supported the legislation because the regulations 
disproportionately inconvenienced rivals reliant on more labour-intensive 
technology.  In the late twentieth century the main beneficiaries of ‘free’ third-level 
education aimed at increasing participation by the poor were the middle class.  The 
main beneficiaries of the Common Agricultural Policy, originally aimed at protecting 
the weak, have been the big farmers, and the greatest beneficiaries of food aid 
programmes directed at the hungry in the Third World have been, again, big farmers 
in the sending countries.lxxvi  The story of savings banks is analogous, particularly 
Irish savings banks in the pre-famine era. 
 FIGURE 1.1: ACCOUNTS, DEPOSITS, AND WITHDRAWALS 1821-1846 
 
A. Sums deposited and withdrawn 1821-1829 
Year      In  (£)    Out (£)  Net (£) 
    
1821      46,615     25,200    21,415 
1822      82,338      8,030    74,308 
1833    123,230    11,723  111,507 
1824    175,292    17,538  157,754 
1825    207,738    35,047  172,691 
1826    156,249    87,085    69,164 
1827    139,080 164,939   -25,859 
1828    254,400 134,608 119,792 
1829    311,600 179,002 132,598 
1830   213,020 
 
B. Accounts and  sums deposited 1833-46 
 
Year  Accounts  £ deposited    Avg. (£) 
1833 49,170    1,327,122    27.0 
1834 53,179    1,450,766    27.3 
1835 58,482    1,608,653    27.5 
1836 63,183    1,759,960    27.9 
1837 63,080    1,771,974    28.1 
1838 69,083    1,989,274    28.8 
1839 74,333    2,158,665    29.0 
1840 75,141    2,152,732    28.6 
1841 77,522    2,243,426    28.9 
1842 80,604    2,354,906    29.2 
1843 82,486    2,447,110    29.7 
1844 91,243    2,749,017    30.1 
1845 96,422    2,921,581    30.3 
1846 93,853    2,855,827    30.4 
 
Source:  Thom’s Irish Almanac for 1848, 192; Black, Economic Thought and the Irish 
Question, 152 fn1 (for 1830). 
 
 
          
TABLE 1.1: ADDRESSES OF CUFFE STREET 
DEPOSITORS IN 1848 (%) 
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TABLE 1.2: OCCUPATIONAL PROFILE OF ACCOUNT HOLDERS, 1852 
A.  PERCENTAGE OF DEPOSITS (£) IN EACH OCCUPATIONAL GROUP: 
 England  Wales  Scotland  Ireland 
1.  Gentlemen  1.2 2.1 1.0 3.6 
2.  Professional  me  0.6 0.9 1.4 1.1 
3. Working in education (M+F)  1.2  0.2  0.1  1.5 
4. Tradesmen, small farmers, etc.  26.0  37.8  29.0  43.7 
5.  Soldiers,  mariners  2.2 2.2 0.6 3.8 
6.  Policemen,  etc.  0.3 0.0 0.1 0.9 
7.  Labourers,  servants,  journeymen  15.0 13.8 16.6 4.8 
8.  Domestic  servants,  nurses,  etc.  (F)  24.0 17.9 20.3 11.0 
9. Dressmakers, shopwomen, female  artisans  2.1 0.1 0.4 0.7 
10.  Married  women,  spinsters,  widows  13.2 14.5 13.6 19.1 
11.  Minors  8.2 5.6 6.6 8.3 
12.  Trust  accounts  1.5 1.9 0.1 1.0 
13.  Misc.  4.6 3.1 10.4  0.6 





B. PERCENTAGE OF ACCOUNTS BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP: 
 England  Wales  Scotland  Ireland 
1. Gentlemen  1.1  2.5  1.2  3.0 
2. Professional men  0.5  1.0  0.8  0.8 
3. Working in education (M+F)  1.0  0.0  0.1  1.5 
4. Tradesmen, small farmers, etc.  23.9  31.7  25.9  40.0 
5. Soldiers, mariners  1.6  2.2  0.5  2.9 
6. Policemen, etc.  0.2       
7. Labouers, servants, journeymen  12.6  15.2  16.3  7.2 
8. Domestic servants, nurses, etc. (F)  22.1  20.1  21.3  14.8 
9. Dressmakers, shopwomen, female 
artisans 
2.4 0.1 0.4  1.1 
10. Married women, spinsters, widows  11.1  13.7  13.4  18.2 
11. Minors  16.3  9.9  11.6  8.3 
12. Trust accounts  2.1  1.3  0.1  1.0 
13. Misc.  5.0  2.2  8.4  0.6 







C. AVERAGE (£) BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP 
 England  Wales  Scotland  Ireland 
1. Gentlemen  28  22  12  33 
2. Professional me  29  24  24  38 
3. Working in education (M+F)  32  43  15  27 
4. Tradesmen, small farmers, etc. (*)  28  32  16  30 
5. Soldiers, mariners  35  27  17  36 
6. Policemen, etc.  34  33  13  39 
7. Labourers, servants, journeymen  31  24  15  18 
8. Domestic servants, nurses, etc. (F)  30  24  14  20 
9. Dressmakers, shopwomen, female 
artisans 
24 24 15  17 
10. Married women, spinsters, widows  32  28  15  29 
11. Minors  13  15  8  27 
12. Trust accounts  18  18  11  28 
13. Misc.  33  24  18  27 
Total (£)  26  27  14  28 
(*) Tradesmen and their assistants, small farmers, clerks, mechanics, artisans not 
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TABLE 1.4: SAVINGS AND DEPOSITS IN THE YEAR 
ENDING 20/11/1845 
Depositors  Number  Avg Deposit (nearest 
£) 
Up to £20     43,281         8 
£21-£50     35,311        31 
£51-£100     12,007        66 
£101-£150       3,109      120 
£151-£200       1,539      168 
>£200         101      227 






TABLE 1.5: DEPOSITOR PROFILE, WEXFORD SB 1841 
  Deposits (£)  Average (£) 
 2 military                162.2    81.1  
  21 teachers             1,243.8    59.2 
140 with no trade           8,028.6    57.3 
162 persons in business     8,461.7    52.2 
68 seafaring men       3,506.9    51.6 
  5 doctors        202.7    40.5 
660 farmers     24,908.1       37.7 
  14 clergymen          519.1    37.1 
20 constabulary           731.6    36.6 
102 working tradesmen     3,678.9      36.1 
142 minors         4,182.8    29.5 
342 servants           7,295.9    21.3 
56 labourers             748.4    13.4 
 8 friendly societies       298.2    37.3 
7 charitable societies       910.0     130.0 
1749 in total     64,876.8     37.1 







TABLE 1.6: SAVINGS BANKS IN ENGLAND/WALES  AND IRELAND, 1828/9 AND 
1845/6 








E & W  403  378  13.52  17  35.8 
Ireland  65 32 0.91  8.5  28.4 
1845/6       
E & W  515  1015 28.95 17 28.5 
Ireland  76 93 2.79 8.5 30.5 





 TABLE 1.7: BANKING COSTS 
A.  IRELAND, ENGLAND/WALES, AND SCOTLAND IN 1848: 
  Ireland  E & W  Scotland 
[1]. Number  61  481  4040 
[2] Annual Cost [£]  9148.8  88421.8  4,913.8 
[3]. Accounts  50,119  909,336  85,472 
[4]. Deposits [£]  1358.1  25,371.2  1,080.2 
[5].  [2]/[3]  0.18 0.10 0.06 
[6].  [2]/[4]  6.74 3.49 4.55 






B. IRELAND AND SCOTLAND, 1850 
 
  ACA  ACB 
Sum deposited 
(£) 
Scotland Ireland  Scotland Ireland 
1,000  .074 .223 .117 .430 
2,000  .072 .223 .116 .429 
5,000  .066 .222 .116 .426 
10,000  .056 .221 .104 .421 
50,000  .033 .215 .103 .383 
100,000  .014 .207 .090 .335 
Source: underlying regression results in Appendix A1.2 
 
 TABLE 1.9: ACCOUNTS AND DEPOSITS 1842-49 
 
Year    Accounts  Sum Deposited (£) 
1842    80,604      2,354,906 
1843    82,486      2,447,110 
1844    91,243      2,749,017 
1845    96,422      2,921,581 




    Source: Thom’s Irish Almanac.  Note that the data refer to 
years ending 20th November. 
  
TABLE 1.8: OCCUPATIONAL CHANGE, IRELAND 1841-1851 
OCCUPATION 1841  1841  %  change 
Farmers 471,398  403,638  -14.4 
Farm labourers, herds, ploughmen, 
gardeners 
1,362,756 1,032,845  -24.2 
Domestic servants  328,889  260,522  -20.8 
Millers, bakers  11,007  14,490  +31.6 
Tavern-keepers, vintners, wine and 
spirit merchants 
7,484 6,070 -18.9 
Huxters, provision dealers, 
tobacconists 
6,515 5,425 -16.7 
Butchers, poulterers, victuallers  9,169  9,115  -0.6 
Dealers (unspecified)  15,347  15,920  +3.7 
Shopkeepers (do.)  10,732  12,176  +13.5 
Merchants (do.)  3,257  2,133  -34.5 
Rate collectors  182  587  +222.5 
Ministering to charity 253  1,898  +650.2 
Coffin makers  8  23  +187.5 
Barristers, attorneys 3,326  3,268  -1.7 
Physicians, surgeons 2,850  2,439  -14.4 
Spinners 516,424  112,275  -78.3 
Weavers 122,631  118,559  -3.3 
Shoemakers 55,728  42.742  -23.3 
Sailors, boatmen, pilots  8,756  23.724  +170.9 
Paupers, beggars 36,137  41,808  +15.7 
All others  537,613  730,064  +35.8 
Total 3,511,860  2,841,623  -19.1 
Source: 1841 and 1851 census reports 
 




TABLE 1.9. NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS BY SIZE 1843-1848 
Sum  on  Deposit  1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 
£20  or  under  38099 41546 43281 40734 37016  25616 
£20-£50  29458 33298 35311 35746 28582  14922 
£50-£100  9691 10601 12007 11906  9904  5113 
£100-£150  2680 3024 3109 3016 2744  1561 
over  £150  1484 1675 1640 1397 1209  717 
Total  81412 90144 95348 92799 79455  47929 
Avg.  deposit  (£)  29.3 29.8  30 30.1 29.8  27.2 
 
Source: Thom’s Almanac, various years.  Charitable and friendly societies’ accounts 
excluded. 
  
APPENDIX 1.1: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1835-6 POOR INQUIRY 
TOWN  WHO SAVED 
Castlebar deposits  generally made by domestic servants, artificers, 
tradesmen, commercial clerks, and small shopkeepers 
Sligo  a few mechanics contribute, and some police and coastguard 
men, and others in small offices, some servants 
Kilkenny principally small farmers from the country, small traders in 
town, and servants 
Drogheda  servants, tradespeople, and others in slender means 
Wexford chiefly the industrious classes 
Bandon  farmers the principal depositors; some servants and a few 
tradesmen 
Cork middling shopkeepers and servants.  Labourers cannot 
contribute and tradesmen are often too drunken to save 
Tralee  several of the lower orders, but the labouring classes do not 
Limerick  farmers are the principal depositors 
Roscrea principally made by the farmers, servants, and small traders 
Dungarvanalmost exclusively shopkeepers and farmers 
Belfast  [1] servants the large majority, farmers, small shopkeepers, 
females, labourers.  Mechanics and artisans in general do not 
lodge, which is to be attributed to the quantity of money spent 
upon drink; [2] servants, tradesmen, workpeople in factories the 
chief contributors. 
Armagh  [1] small farmers, tradesmen, and servants; [2] chiefly servants 
Bangor  generally servants and tradesmen 
Newry not  generally of the mechanic or labouring classes 
Enniskillen small farmers who have cheap spots of land, some servants, and 
some operatives 
Monaghan tradesmen, farmers, and servants 




APPENDIX 1.2: THE COST STRUCTURE OF IRISH AND SCOTTISH BANKS 
  Scotland Ireland  Scotland Ireland 











































N 42 52 42 52 
R2  0.768 0.082 0.430 0.449 
     Note: AC(1) is defined as TC divided by the number of accounts, 
while AC(2) is total cost relative to capital as given in BPP 1852, 






 Scotland Ireland 
  Mean SD  Mean  SD 
Deposits 31528.1  82844.7  24739.3  45407.7 
Percent unpaid 
labour 
0.428 0.271  0.306  0.184 
Deposits per 
annum 
4210.5 12246.8 1424.0  3805.1 
Withdrawals per 
annum 
2595.9 7522.4 953.1  1885.6 
ACA 0.067  0.068  0.174  0.82 
ACB 0.445    0.587   
 
   APPENDIX 1.3: THE NAMES OF CUFFE STREET DEPOSITORS 
 
Today as in the past the names that parents choose for their children make a 
statement.  In nineteenth-century Ireland the choice of given name was constrained by 
family, local, and confessional considerations.  Fashion may have played a role too.  The 
dominant role of a relatively small number of names is striking, especially given the 
high marital fertility levels then obtaining.  Even in Dublin one-third of all girls were 
called Mary or Ann, while nearly one-half of boys were named John, William, Thomas, 
or Patrick (Tables A1.1 and A1.2).  In an earlier study differences in the naming 
preferences of Dublin’s working-class Catholics and Protestants were detected.77  For 
example, Protestant girls were much more likely to be called Jane or Susan and Catholic 
girls Bridget; Catholic boys were three times as likely to be called Patrick as Protestant 
boys, while George, William, and Robert were disproportionately ‘Protestant’ names.  
Catholic choices tended to be narrower in the sense that a smaller number of names 
accounted for the bulk of the choices. 
What of the depositors in the Cuffe Street savings bank?  As noted above, in 1850 
parliament voted a sum of £30,000 as partial compensation for depositors.  Details of the 
claimants’ names, addresses, and awards are given in a parliamentary report.78 The 
most common given names in the lists of 542 female claimants holding £10 or less and 
370 male claimants holding £20 or less were as shown below in the final columns of 
Tables A1.3 and A1.4. 
In compiling this list variants such as Nancy, Betty, Eliza, and Maria were 
included under Ann, Elizabeth, and Mary.  The range of choice was again remarkably 
narrow.79  More than one female account-holder in three was named either Mary or 
Ann, and ten names accounted for almost four-fifths of female account-holders.  No 
male name had the same dominance as Mary, but the top ten male names accounted for 
three-quarters of the total. 
 In Tables A1.3 and A1.4 these lists are compared with those of poorer Catholics 
and Protestants in Dublin in the 1840s.  Given that the population of Dublin was then about three-quarters Catholic and one-quarter Protestant, and the Catholic proportion of 
the working-class population even higher, a random draw of first names should be 
more like the Catholic than the Protestant distribution.  However, the distributions of 
both men’s and women’s names in the Cuffe Street list are closer to the Protestant than 
the Catholic patterns in the city at large.  Setting the Cuffe Street proportions against the 
Protestant proportions below produced chi-square statistics of 18.4 and 8.0 for women 
and men, respectively, while setting them against the Catholic proportions produced 







TABLE A1.1.  MOST COMMON WOMEN’S NAMES 
Rank Name  Number  %  Cumulative  % 
1 Mary 121  22.3  22.3 
2 Ann  72  13.3  35.6 
3 Catherine  47  8.7  44.3 
4 Margaret 38  7.0  51.3 
5 Eliza  37  6.8  58.1 
6 Elizabet  26  4.8  62.9 
7 Bridget 26  4.8  67.7 
8 Jane  22  4.1  71.8 
9 Ellen  22  4.1  75.9 
10 Sarah  17  3.1 79.0 
11 Susan  11  2.0 81.0 
12 Charlotte  8  1.5 82.5 
13 Alice  8  1.5 84.0 
14 Fanny 7  1.3  85.3 
15 Julia  6  1.1 86.4 
16 Harriet  5  0.9 87.3 
17 Rose  5  0.9 88.2 






TABLE A1.2. MOST COMMON MEN’S NAMES: 
Rank  Name  Number  %   Cumulative % 
1 John  63  17.0  17.0 
2 William  49  13.2  30.2 
3 Thomas  34  9.2  39.4 
4 Patrick 34  9.2  48.6 
5 James  30  8.1  56.7 
6 Robert  17  4.6  61.3 
7 George 14  3.8  65.1 
8 Edward  12  3.2  68.3 
9 Michael  12  3.2  71.6 
10 Richard  10  2.7 74.3 
11 Joseph  8  2.2 76.5 
12 Charles  6  1.6 78.1 
13 Daniel  5  1.4 79.4 
14 Peter  5  1.4 80.8 
15 Timothy 5  1.4 82.2 




TABLE A1.3. RELIGION AND WOMEN’S NAMES 
 
Name  Catholic  Protestant   Cuffe Street 
Mary 28.7  21.7  22.3 
Catherine 10.3  6.2  8.7 
Anne 14.1  13.8  13.3 
Elizabeth 8.4  11.8  11.6 
Bridget 7.0  1.2  4.8 
Margaret 9.6  7.3  7.0 
Ellen 4.1  4.2 4.1 
Jane 3.2  7.4  4.1 
Sarah 2.3  4.7  3.3 
Judith 1.9  0.3  0.6 
Esther 1.9  0.5  0.7 
Susan 0.5  3.3  2.0 
Honora 0.9  0.3  0.7 
Others 7.1  20.0  16.8 
Top 6       
  
TABLE A1.4. RELIGION AND MEN’S NAMES: 
Name Catholic Protestant    Cuffe  Street 
John 20.6  20.9  17.0 
James 10.4  10.7 8.1 
Patrick 13.2  4.8  9.2 
Michael 5.8  3.3  3.2 
Thomas 8.5  8.6  9.2 
William 8.2  12.6  13.2 
Peter 2.4  1.9 1.4 
Edward 3.9  4.0  3.2 
Richard 3.0  3.0  2.7 
Francis 3.0  1.2  0.8 
George 1.9  3.4  3.8 
Denis 1.7  0.3  0.8 
Charles 1.3  1.1  1.6 
Robert 1.1  3.6  4.6 
Owen 0.7  0.5  0.8 
Joseph 0.7  1.7  2.2 
Laurence 0.6  0.2  0.3 
Matthew 0.4  0.6  0.3 
Others 12.5  17.6  17.6 
Top 6  66.7  61.6  61.3 
Source: derived from BPP (1851); Ó Gráda (1995: Table 8b) 
 
 HISTORIOGRAPHICAL NOTE:  
From John Tidd Pratt on, the historians of savings banks have been mainly 
‘insiders’ engaged in commemorative history.  Most have been either long-serving 
executives of the institutions they describe or — a more recent phenomenon — authors 
specially commissioned by the institution in question.  H. Oliver Horne, historian of 
Britain’s savings banks, had been full-time secretary of the Trustee Savings Bank 
Association since 1930.  W. Ernest Tyrrell’s history of Belfast Savings Bank is full of 
photographs of that bank’s worthies.   J.D. Campbell, historian of the Savings Bank of 
Glasgow, was that bank’s senior executive for fifteen years.  James Knox, historian of the 
Savings Bank of Airdrie, was one of a dynasty of Knoxes to serve as managers.80  Alf 
McCreary’s very readable history of Northern Ireland’s savings banks was 
commissioned by TSB Northern Ireland.  Michael Moss and Iain Russell were similarly 
commissioned by the TSB to write about the Scottish banks.  Most of the early histories 
of the American savings banks were also by insiders, again either former bank staff or 
commissioned authors.   
Distanced, more sceptical notes were sounded by John Clapham, Albert Fishlow, 
and Neil Smelser in their assessment of savings banks in England.  The accounts by 
economic historians Alan Olmstead of New York’s savings banks and Peter Payne and 
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